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Paper ini berupaya menganalisa implikasi perilaku bank dalam menentukan portofolio terhadap
tingkat efektivitas kebijakan moneter. Dengan kerangka analisa comparative static, paper ini
mengetengahkan model industri perbankan yang bersifat monopolis dimana pemilik bank memaksimalkan
profit dengan kendala tertentu baik yang  berasal dari kesanggupan modal maupun kendala akibat
regulasi.
Kalibrasi model pada kondisi optimal, mengindikasikan bahwa penurunan fungsi disintermediasi
bank yang didominasi oleh faktor asymmetric information, akan berakibat pada menurunnya efektifitas
kebijakan moneter.
Kesimpulan ini berimplikasi pada (i) perlunya Biro Kredit dan rating agencies untuk menyempurnakan
informasi, (ii) perlunya investasi yang lebih besar oleh perbankan atas kapasitas riset dan sistem monitor-
ing, (iii) perlunya mempertimbangkan skema garansi kredit, (iv) perlunya koordinasi yang lebih baik antara
kebijakan mikro dan makro demi kestabilan makro yang akan meningkatkan keyakinan publik dan terakhir,
(v) perlunya mempromosikan perkembangan lembaga keuangan non-bank, untuk mengurangi
ketergantungan pembiayaan atas lembaga perbankan.
JEL: E52, E58, G21
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I.  BACKGROUND
It is widely known that banks play a determinant role in financing economic development.
Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003) argued that this is so because banks are superior to other financial
institutions in coping with asymmetric information and high cost operations in financial
intermediary activities. By their nature, banks are capable of dealing with different types of
borrowers, and with an appropriate regulatory framework and institutional set up, banks are
better equipped to deal with asymmetric information problems.
In emerging countries or economies like Indonesia the role of banks is even more critical.
Banks are not only the major source of funding to small, medium as well as large corporations,
they also determine the business cycle of the economy as a whole. For example, in Indonesia
during 2001 √ 2004, the flows of credit from the banking sector contributed on average about
77% of total financing from major financial institutions (banks, bond markets, and stock markets).
As a result, the rise and fall of banks has strong correlation with economic booms and busts in
Indonesia. This phenomenon can also be observed in many emerging countries. However,
escaping this phenomenon is not easy in most emerging countries as the development of non-
bank financial institutions is usually constrained by inadequate institutional capacity and
infrastructure as well as weak legal foundation.
Looking at the micro level, a bank»s behavior in selecting their portfolio composition also
plays an important role in explaining monetary policy transmission (see e.g. Silber [1969] &
Beckhart [1940]). Within a bank»s portfolio, special attention is given to credit because this type
of asset is most dominant in a normal and well functioning bank. The growing awareness of
the importance of credit in the monetary policy transmission process is driven, among others,
by concerns over the impact of financial sector weaknesses, bank failures, non-performing
loans (NPLs), and credit rationing on the effectiveness of the transmission process (see e.g.
Blinder [1987], Bernanke and Blinder [1988], Brunner and Metzler [1988]). In the past, monetary
literature has paid little attention to the role of credit due to the emergence of monetarist
thinking and the overriding influence of Keynesian thought on ≈Liquidity Preference∆ that
stresses the importance of money rather than credit (Gertler [1988]). As proposed by Stiglitz
and Greenwald, a new monetary policy paradigm should really be re-focusing its attention
toward the importance of supply and demand for credits in the economy.
Within this context, this paper tries to analyze the implication of banks» behavior in
selecting their portfolio choices on the effectiveness of monetary policy. A very simple model
has been designed and the analysis will compare banks» behavior and their impact on the
effectiveness of monetary policy before and during the post-crisis period. We begin with a
historical overview of the development of the banking sector and monetary policy in Indonesia.
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We then proceed with a brief explanation of the model being used in analyzing banks» behavior.
Based on this framework, an empirical simulation on the impact of banking disintermediation
on policy transmission in Indonesia was conducted. Lastly, we conclude with how changes in
banks» internal and external conditions can alter the efficacy of monetary policy and provide
some note worthy recommendations.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BANKING SECTOR AND MONETARY POLICY IN
INDONESIA
II.1  Pre-Crisis Period: 1960s - Mid 1997
Prior to a series of financial deregulations in the 1980s, state-owned banks dominated
the banking sector, holding 80% of total bank assets. State-owned banks acted almost as
the sole credit provider to the real sector and played as agents of development by channeling
significant amounts of government subsidized loans. These banks were heavily regulated, to
such an extent that interest rate determination was controlled, by the government, to an
artificially low level, hence discouraging efficient fund mobilization and stifling competition.
Under such conditions, monetary policy is conducted through the use of direct control
instruments. Following a successful macro economic stabilization program in the second half of
the 1960s, the Central Bank employed direct monetary instruments such as imposing a ceiling on
lending rates and the volume of loans, injecting subsidized credits, and endorsing selective foreign
exchange controls, whereas the exchange rate regime was relatively fixed. Supported by windfall
profits from the oil boom, this was marked as the era of government-led growth lasting through
the 70s and 80s with an average annual economic growth rate of 7.5%.
The world recession and the dramatic oil price drop in the early 1980s prompted the
government to change its development strategy. As the current account deficit widened, thus
threatening the external positions of the country, and GDP growth dropped to 2.3% in 1982,
the government took sweeping adjustment measures. As an initial step, the government devalued
the Rupiah by 38% to correct the external imbalance by stimulating non-oil exports. In addition,
the government postponed some large government projects, amounting to around US$10
billion of public expenditure. Furthermore, the government realized that it could no longer act
as the main engine of growth as fiscal sustainability was under pressure. Consequently, the
government gradually shifted its dominant role as development agent to the private sector by
encouraging the promotion of the banking sector and the financial sector as a whole in order
to tap private savings and channel them into private investments expeditiously. This was done
through a number of deregulation policy packages in the financial sector.
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The first financial deregulation was introduced in June 1983, known as PAKJUN 83,
involving three aspects, namely, (1) abolishing the credit ceiling that had been used as a means
of monetary control and introducing indirect monetary instruments, (2) reducing the injection
of liquidity credit provided by Bank Indonesia, and (3) granting freedom to state-owned banks
to set their own interest rates and allowing more opportunities to all banks to mobilize deposits
from the public. Consequently, the share of private banks in lending increased rapidly, funded
by deposit mobilization, inter-bank borrowing from state banks, and offshore borrowing.
To expedite the mobilization of funds,  another policy package was issued in October 1988,
known as PAKTO 1988, aimed at  promoting non-oil exports, enhancing banks» and non-banks»
efficiency, improving the efficacy of monetary policy, and creating a conducive climate for capital
market development. These measures effectively marked the new and liberalized financial
environment era, abandoning the financially repressive regime. On the banking front, this deregulation
package facilitated easier openings of new banks and their branches. Within two years, licenses to
open 73 new commercial banks and 301 branches were issued. Since then, banking activities have
increased substantially in terms of assets and the number of banks (Graph II.1). The other important
aspects of this package included the permission of state-owned and local government enterprises
to deposit up to 50% of their funds in private banks and the possibility for banks to merge along
with efforts to reduce credit risks.
This ≈big bang∆ approach in financial deregulation, complemented by several deregulation
packages, did not only affect the banking sector but also the development of non-bank financial
institutions and capital markets. Capital markets developed rapidly as reflected by the growing
number of firms listed in the Jakarta Stock Exchange, expanding volume of shares traded, and
Graph II.1 Banks» Assets
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increasing market capitalization. Non-bank financial institutions and capital markets emerged
as alternative sources of firms» financing. In spite of this, the dominance of the banking sector
remained. The increasing role of banks in Indonesia prior to the crisis period was verified by the
rapid growth of credit (Graph II.2) and higher monetization. The ratio of M1 and M2 over GDP
steadily increased, as demand for money rose, in conformity with growing economic activities
(Graph II.3).
The deregulation measures had remarkable impacts on the development of the banking
industry. Not only the number of banks soared, but also the network of banking services widened,
banking activities and the variety of banking products offered expanded; and instruments used
Graph II.2 Growth of Credit and GDP
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in the money market diversified. It also gave the opportunity for the Central Bank to launch
more market-based indirect monetary policy instruments. During 1983 - 1984, the minimum
reserve requirement was reduced from 15% to 2% and open market operation mechanisms
were improved through the auctions of two monetary instruments, namely the central bank
certificates (SBI) and money market securities (SBPU).
In response to the rapid changes in the banking sector, the authorities strengthened
prudential regulations with the objectives of creating a sound and more efficient banking
system to safeguard the interest of the general public and contribute to Indonesian economic
development. Recognizing the possibility of banks taking on excessive risks due to promising
economic growth, each bank was required to maintain capital at a minimum of 8% of its
risk-weighted assets, in line with the standard set by the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS). Bank Indonesia also set regulations on legal lending limits, preventing a concentration
of bank credit to certain debtors. Considering that the soundness of a bank does not depend
only on the quality of its investments but also on its capability to anticipate possible losses in
the investments, adequate provisioning for risk assets was made mandatory.
The prudential regulations also covered other supporting factors for improving banking
operations such as a reporting system and various management aspects, including human
resource development. For instance, each bank was required to allocate at least 5% of its
budget for human resources aimed at improving the quality of bank personnel which, in
turn, would sustain the development of banking activities.
In February 1991 more comprehensive prudential banking principles were endorsed
and banks were urged to merge or consolidate. Unfortunately, expected widespread banking
consolidation never took place due to a lack of commitment by bank owners. Meanwhile,
banks kept on pumping credit supply to the economy excessively.
To prevent the economy from overheating, in January 1991 a tight monetary policy
was introduced. The government ordered major state-owned enterprises to switch their
deposits into SBI, the central bank certificates, and banks» access to offshore borrowing was
constrained. In addition, the exchange rate band was widened, hindering negative impacts
of short-term capital flows and lessening the dependency of banks on foreign exchange
transactions with Bank Indonesia. These policies brought the inflation rate under control to
4.9%, but at the expense of a soaring interest rate.
A few years later, however, the financial sector returned to its high speed growth. Over
the period of 1993 - 1997, the average annual growth of credit reached 22.6%. Banks»
lending capacity (measured as total assets minus cash in vault, paid-in capital, and reserve
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requirement) grew 22% fueled by the rapid growth of private deposits. The Loan to Deposit
Ratio (LDR) reached an average of 80.5%. The capital market was bullish, actively acting as
another source of financing. The market capitalization of the Jakarta Stock Exchange reached
29.7% of GDP. The economy was overheating and asset price bubbles emerged. The economy
and the banking sector were prone to shocks.
The major factor contributing to the vulnerability of the banking sector was the inherent
weaknesses prevailing in the national banking industry. Firstly, the implicit guarantee from
the central bank that banks should not be allowed to fail -so as to prevent systemic risk to the
banking system- had led to moral hazards and adverse selection problems on the part of
bank owners and management. In addition, the implicit guarantee induced banks» leverage
to extent imprudent bank credit with less caution to high risk sectors. As a result, commercial
bank risk was shifted to the central bank while systemic risk in the banking system mounted.
Secondly, supervision by the central bank was less than fully effective as the central
bank was unable to keep up with the rapid progress and increasing complexity of bank
operations. Consequently, banks were lured to overlook prudential principles governing their
operations. Although Indonesia had adopted international standards for prudential regulations,
the existing weaknesses in law enforcement and lack of central bank independence resulted
in ineffective supervision and inadequate corrective measures.
Thirdly, sizable connected lending (either directly or indirectly to individuals or business
groups), raised commercial banks» exposure to the risk of non-performing loans. While various
disciplinary measures entailing strong sanctions had been introduced to prevent unsound
lending practices, violations persisted due mainly to the structure of private national banks»
ownership, which tended to be concentrated on few groups or individuals.
Fourthly, the relatively low managerial skills in banking led to a weakening productive
asset quality and rising risk exposure. This was aggravated by the existing weaknesses in
internal supervision and the information system which resulted in a failure to monitor, detect,
and solve non-performing loans and excessive risk exposure. These weaknesses further limited
banks» ability to anticipate and overcome the emergence of financial crisis.
Finally, a lack of transparent information on bank conditions undermined not only the
accuracy of the analysis of banks» financial positions but also inhibited efforts to introduce
social control and market discipline. This factor contributed to an erosion of confidence in
the banking sector, which raised the systemic risk in the banking industry.
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II.2 Crisis Period: Mid 1997 - Mid 1999
In July 1997, following a contagion effect from Thailand and South Korea, the Rupiah
exchange rate came under severe attack. Given the existing various fundamental weaknesses
in the domestic economy, the exchange rate shock developed rapidly into severe economic and
financial crises. On the external sector, the exchange rate crisis drove substantial private capital
outflows, bringing about a deficit in the balance of payments for the first time since 1989/90.
Furthermore, outstanding debt and amortization of principal soared, especially in Rupiah terms,
which caused the default of many firms in their external obligation.
The exchange rate crisis, followed by a crisis of confidence caused banks to incur losses
and experience severe liquidity problems, making them dependent on the central bank»s liquidity
support. Concerns over the possibility of another round of bank closures, following the
government»s decision to close 16 banks in November 1997, and the absence of a guarantee
program on deposits spread panic among depositors for the safety of their deposits with
commercial banks.2  This led to bank runs and a flight from unsound to sound banks which
drained banks» liquidity. The massive liquidity support extended by the central bank, in turn,
prompted the rapid expansion of money supply, which gave further rise to the prevailing high
level of inflation (77% in 1998) as a consequence of the pass through effect of the sharp
Rupiah depreciation.
The crisis put banking performance at its nadir. Intricate with increasing firms bankruptcies,
non-performing loans (NPLs) rose significantly. Market correction to asset price bubbles and
worsened balance-sheets of both firms and banks caused credit to shrink. LDR dropped to
26%. Supply of loans fell off significantly in response to the banking crisis. Zulverdi et al (2004a)
found a strong indication that from August 1997 through December 1998, there was a credit
crunch phenomenon in Indonesia. The findings on the credit crunch in the early stage of the
crisis are consistent with Agung et al (2001) and Ghosh and Ghosh (1999), and differ only in
their predictions of when the phenomenon was at end.
To cope with the crisis, the Government introduced various measures. In the
implementation, however, the Government was confronted with a dilemma. In the monetary
and banking sector, the efforts to stabilize the exchange rate through raising interest rates and
tightening monetary stance increased the vulnerability of the banking industry and the business
sectors.3  The central bank therefore, was confronted with dilemma between maintaining
2 Later on, to prevent another cycle of bank rush, the government introduced a blanket guarantee scheme which effectively guaranteed
the payment of all types of bank liabilities.
3 To cope with the battered Rupiah, the Government initially relied more on the monetary policy with the hindsight that the pressure
was transitory in nature. At the beginning of the crisis, Bank Indonesia widened the intervention band from 8% to 12%, combined
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monetary stability and rescuing the banking industry and the business sectors. In the fiscal
area, the efforts to control domestic demand through government spending had been less
effective due to lack of transparency and weaknesses in the supervision of government
expenditure, including public enterprises. In the industry and trade sectors, efforts to strengthen
efficiency and sound competition have been impeded by the oligopolistic and monopolistic
market and distorted incentive system. These factors reflect the onerous pressure that rendering
partial solutions to the problem could not adequately solve during the ongoing crisis. Therefore,
in addition to restoring economic stability, the government was determined to launch reforms
across the board.
II.3 Post-Crisis Period: Mid 1999 - Present
The government»s decision to launch a blanket guarantee scheme (1998) and a bank
recapitalization program (1999 - 2000) successfully restored public confidence in the banking
system. Base money steadily declined, public funds flew back into the banking system, and
banks» lending capacity improved (Table II.1).
Table II.1. Banking Indicators
Indicators 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004*
Total Asset (Trilions ofRp) 291,271 333,708 413,800 506,869 715,205 895,487 1,006,656 1,048,208 1,099,699 1,109,130 1,163,758 1,179,431
Credit (Trilions of Rp) 150,271 188,880 234,611 292,921 378,134 487,426 225,133 269,000 307,594 365,410 437,942 471,064
CAR  (%) 9.9 12.5 11.9 11.8 9.2 -15.7 -8.1 2.3 19.3 23.1 19.3 22.8
LDR (%) 78.5 81.2 81. 178.3 82.6 72.4 26.0 33.7 33.1 38.4 43.2 43.7
ROA (%) 1.0 0.6 1.1 1.2 1.4 -18.8 -6.1 1.0 1.4 2.0 2.5 2.7
ROE (%) 9.3 3.0 16.1 16.4 19.1 -437.2 -110.8 9.7 13.6 15.0 21.6 6.7
NIM (%) 9.9 12.5 11.9 11.8 15.8 -61.2 -38.6 22.8 37.8 32.1 42.7 56.6
NPL (%) 16.4 13.6 11.1 9.5 8.1 53.8 36.9 19.4 11.7 7.6 6.8 6.3
* Mei
These improved conditions, however, did not guarantee the return of banking
intermediation to normality. The completion of the first phase of the bank recapitalization
program in mid 1999 brought immediate improvements to banks» balance sheets and expanded
their capacity to offer loans. Nonetheless, loan demand plunged dramatically from early 1999.
with intervention both in the forward and spot markets. In view of the stronger pressure on the rupiah, on 14th August 1997 Bank
Indonesia decided to abandon the managed floating exchange rate system and adopt the free floating system. To mop up the excess
liquidity, the discount rate on SBI was raised, and public enterprises» deposits with state and private banks were shifted into SBIs.
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4 For a detailed explanation of the specification and the estimation results of the model that was used to get this indication, please
refer to Zulverdi et al (2004a)
Consequently, there is an indication of a reversed situation from a long period of excess demand
for loans during the pre-crisis period and a short period of credit crunch during the peak of the
crisis to a period of excess loan supply since 2001 (Graph II.4).4
The indication of excess loan supply was more pronounced among existing (good)
borrowers. As banks compete with each other to keep their good borrowers, they increase
the supply of loan commitment to them. However, the borrowers» capacities to absorb new
Graph II.4 Estimation of Loan Supply and Demand
Ln Loans
11.00
11.25
11.50
11.75
12.00
12.25
12.50
12.75
13.00
13.25
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Estimated Loan Demand
Estimated Loan Supply
Actual Loans
Graph II.5 Ratio of Undisbursed Loan to
Loan Ceiling by Purpose of Use (%)
Percent
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Proportion of Total UL to Total Loan Ceiling
Proportion of UL on Working Capital Credit
Proportion of UL on Investment Credit
Proportion of UL on Consumption Credit
509Banking Disintermediation and Its Implication for Monetary Policy: The Case of Indonesia
loans are limited (due to unfavorable business prospects and/or high leverage ratio) and
some large-middle sized borrowers are able to tap into the capital market with a lower cost
of borrowing. Coupled with persistently high loan interest rates (though this has been declining
slowly) and a low commitment fee, this situation has induced an increasing trend of
undisbursed loans (Graph II.5).
The study on this phenomenon (Zulverdi et al, 2004 a) has shown that the rise in loan
supply during the post-crisis period was driven by:
(i) Steady improvement in bank capital during the post-bank restructuring program, enabling
banks to book significant profits in the past two years. The bank CAR is in much stronger
shape, well above the minimum required 8%, thus banks have considerable headroom for
loan expansion.
(ii) Improved structure in bank assets following the introduction of trading in government bonds.
The last two years have seen rapid growth in government bonds registered in trading
portfolios, up from 14.9% of total recapitalization bond portfolios at the end of 2001 to
47% at the end of 2003.  The expansion in trading portfolios has given banks added liquidity
and expanded capacity to lend.
(iii) Improved non-performing loans (NPLs) ratio. The improvement in the NPLs ratio also provides
banks with more headroom to expand loan supply. NPLs (gross) have improved significantly,
easing from 11.65% at the end of 2001 to 6.77% at the end of 2003.
(iv) Persistently high lending rates in relation to interest rates on other earning assets, such as
SBIs and government bonds, and a declining cost of funds have improved the banks» appetite
to expand lending.5
Triggering factors constraining loan demand are:
(i) Lack of investment demand due to a non-conducive climate (political and legal uncertainties).
This is consistent with findings that economic growth was essentially consumption driven.
(ii) Banks tendency toward a more risk averse attitude and the problem of asymmetric
information have resulted in downward rigidity of the loan interest rate. The widened spread
between the loan and deposit rates has stirred the expectation among debtors of future
easing in loan interest rates in line with the declining cost of funds. Thus, debtors are
holding back from applying to banks for new loans or are delaying their draw down on
agreed loan commitments.
(iii) High loan interest rates have prompted some eligible companies to seek alternative financing
sources, for example, by issuing bonds with a lower yield. This is evident in the volume of
5 Interest rates on monetary instruments, including SBI, declined substantialy during the period, reflecting the ease monetary policy
conducted by the Central Bank.
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private sector bond issues that reached Rp25.6 trillion in 2003, as compare to Rp6.5 and
Rp2.3 trillion in 2002 and 2001, respectively.
(iv) Asymmetric information has resulted in banks focusing their lending only to a particular
group of preferred debtors or debtors with known track records. Consequently, new debtors
are excluded from access to bank credits.
During this period, theory would predict that monetary policy should be more effective
since it is conducted in a flexible exchange rate regime, while the Central Bank has been
granted full independence. However, the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission has not
improved as reflected in the slow response of loan rates to reduction in SBI rates and the
widening spread between loan and deposit rates (Graph II.6). A survey conducted by Bank
Indonesia suggests that although borrowers were willing to pay a high interest rate and provide
more collateral, banks were not willing to approve the loans.
There was also a change in banks» preferences in their investment portfolios, where
banks had a tendency to hold more liquid and less-risky assets. Consequently, the impact of
easing monetary policy is largely reflected in the increase of short-term consumption oriented
credit rather than investment credit (Graph II.7). Loan to deposit ratio was still low.
Graph II.6 Interest Rate Development
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III. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF BANKS» BEHAVIOR
III.1 The Model
Based on work by Zulverdi et al (2004b), we developed a static partial equilibrium model
as an analytical framework to understand how banks» portfolio behavior in maximizing their
profit links to the efficacy of monetary policy. Simplifying the model, we assume that the
Indonesian banking sector behaves like a monopoly and has the following balance sheet
structure:
Table II.2. Balance Sheet of Commercial Banks
Assets Liabilities
Excess Reserve (incl. cash in vault)
Reserve Requirement
Loans
Government Bonds
SBI and Fasbi (central bank instruments)
Inter-bank Money Market
Saving and Demand Deposits
Time Deposits
Capital
As intermediary institutions, banks collect funds from surplus spending units with a certain
cost and distribute it to deficit spending units by imposing a certain interest rate as banks»
earning. Aside from deposit interest cost, banks also face contemporaneous transaction
(management) costs in the form of quadratic functions on both the assets and liabilities side.6
6 We use the quadratic cost function to fulfill the usual convexity and regularity assumptions.
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Banks» objective function is to maximize its profit as follows:
(II.1)
where profit function is defined as
Note: List of variables is presented in the appendix
In maximizing their profits, banks are subject to the following constraints:
Bank assets should be equal to their liabilities at all times (equation II.2).
(II.2)
Demand for loans is a linear function with a negative relationship to the loan interest rate
(equation II.3).
(II.3)
Supply of time deposit and saving deposit are both linear functions with a positive relationship
to time deposit rates and saving deposit rates respectively (equation II.4 and II.5).
(II.4)
(II.5)
Banks always maintain a certain level of excess reserve (in cash and in accounts at the
Central Bank) as a proportion of deposits (equation II.6).
(II.6)
The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) imposed by Bank Indonesia limits banks» behavior in
maximizing their profit. As risk averse investors, banks can calculate risk-weighted asset
(RWA) on loans higher than that imposed by the central bank. (equation II.7)
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(II.7)
Interest rate on monetary instruments, SBI and FASBI are exogenous and set up by Bank
Indonesia. Interest rates of government bonds are also exogenous.
Solving this optimization problem will give some clues about how changes in monetary
policy affect a bank»s portfolio, and furthermore, explain how monetary policy is transmitted
via banks. Following are some important findings that relate banks» responses to changes in
policy rate (SBI).
Impacts of a Change in Policy Rates on Loan Volume
(II.8)
As the theory predicts, the volume of loans (    ) has a negative relationship with policy rates
(   ). A reduction of policy rates, for example, will shift the allocation of funds from central
bank certificates (SBI) into loans. Equation II.8 indicates that monetary policy transmission
will be less effective (as reflected in lower sensitivity of loan volume to changes in policy
rates) if borrowers are less sensitive to interest rates (  is lower), CAR (   ) is high, banks»
perception on default risks is high as reflected in high risk weighted assets on loans (   )7 ,
marginal cost of managing loans (    ) are high, and non-performing loans ratio (   ) is low.
As long as banks continue to perceive high loan risks (    ) in contrast to low risk on holding
SBIs (    ), banks would consequently reluctant to expand loans, particularly to new debtors.
Therefore, lowering loan risk perception would be expected to encourage banks to expand
lending and discourage them from dominant holding of SBIs.
Impacts of a Change in Policy Rates on Loan Rates
(II.9)
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Loan rates (    ) have a positive relationship with policy rates (equation II.9).  Monetary policy
transmission will be less effective (as reflected in lower sensitivity of loan rates to changes in
policy rates) when banks» perception on default risk is high, CAR is high, and marginal costs
of managing loan are high.
The negative impact of higher default risks on the effectiveness of monetary policy
transmission is consistent with the phenomenon of asymmetric effects of monetary policy.
In the recession (economic crisis) when default risk tends to be high, a loose monetary
policy would not be optimally followed by a decrease in loan rates (an increase in loan
volume). In contrast, during an expansion period in which default risk is relatively lower, a
tight monetary policy would be effectively followed by an increase in loan rates (a decrease
in loan volume). In this environment, a tight monetary policy may be more effective than
more lax monetary policy.8
Impacts of a Change in Policy Rates on Spread between Loan Rates and Time Deposit Rates
(II.10)
Equation II.10 indicates that when banks» perception on default risks (    ) and CAR ratio (    )
are substantially high relative to the non-performing loan ratio (   ), reserve requirement
ratio (    ), and excess reserve ratio (    ), the policy rate will have a negative impact on the
spread between loan rates and deposit rates. Therefore, in an easing monetary condition,
for example, a decline in policy rates would widen the spread.
This negative relationship reflects a situation when bank perceives that the costs of credit
defaults are larger than the opportunity cost of holding non-productive funds (NPLs + reserve
requirement + excess reserve). In this situation, bank tends to move loan rates slower than
deposit rates.
III.2 Empirical Analysis
Based on the above analytical results, we have run an empirical analysis for Indonesia»s
case by calibrating some of the parameters of the model. We divide the simulation into three
periods: 1) pre-crisis (1996.01 - 1997.06), 2) crisis (1997.07 - 1999.06), and (3) post-crisis
(1999.07 - 2004.03). The followings are some important findings (Table II.2).
8 Kato et al (1999), for example, has proved empirically the existence of this phenomenon in Japan.
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Table II.3. Simulation Results
A. Indicators of Effectiveness of
Monetary Transmission via Banks:
dL/drS -7725 -8332 -7635
drL/drS 0.423 0.396 0.410
d(rL - rD)/drS -0.005 -0.006 -0.005
B. Banks» Internal Conditions:
Default Risks (γ1) 1.451 7.80 1.85
CAR (Ω) 0.11 0.02 0.14
NPL (η) 0.11 0.30 0.19
C. Demand for Loan Conditions:
Constant (e) 395000 630660 402116
Slope (f) -10050 -11983 -10325
D. Supply of Time Deposit Conditions:
Constant (a) -337500 -426342 -332003
Slope (b) 30500 14077 31071
E. Monetary Policy Conditions:
Policy Rates (rS) 0.13 0.38 0.13
Reserve Requirements (ρD) 0.03 0.05 0.05
Pre-Crisis
1996.01 - 1997.06
Crisis
1997.07 - 1999.06
Post-Crisis
1999.07 - 2004.03
Monetary Transmission via the Banking Channel during the Peak of the Crisis Period
There are strong indications that the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission via banking
channels was significantly lower during the peak of the crisis period. There is evidence of
less sensitivity of loan rates to changes in SBI rates (              ) during the crisis as compared
to the pre-crisis period. According to the simulation results, two major factors may be
responsible for this condition. First, the economic crisis and its impact on mounting NPLs
had increased banks» perception of default risks very significantly. This factor reduced banks»
willingness to increase loan rates as a response to higher policy rates as it would worsen its
NPLs. Second, as most borrowers experienced huge solvability problems, they became more
sensitive to loan rate changes (the slope of loan demand,    , increased). This factor reduced
banks» ability to increase loan rates without losing their good customers. Both factors were
so dominant that they overshadowed the incentive to increase loan interest revenues to
cover the losses from higher NPLs.
As borrowers were more sensitive to loan rate changes and banks suffered huge losses from
SL rr ∂∂ /
f
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higher NPLs, the negative impact of higher policy rates on loan volume (               )  were
larger during crisis.
As default risks were substantially high, the perceived costs of credit defaults were higher
than the opportunity cost of holding idle funds (funds ≈trapped∆ in bad debts, reserve
requirement, and excess reserves). This made loan rates less sensitive to policy rates relative
to deposit rates. Consequently, the rise in SBI rates increased deposit rates much faster than
the climb in loan rates                                , creating a negative interest margin (Graph II.8).
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Monetary Policy Transmission during the Post Crisis Period
The improvement of monetary policy transmission has been very slow during the post-crisis
period. The sensitivity of loan rates to policy rate changes (                 ) increased only slightly,
and is still smaller than the sensitivity during the pre-crisis period. Although banks» perception
of default risk has improved significantly, banks are still very cautious as evidenced by a
higher CAR ratio than the level required by regulation. The positive income effect of smaller
NPLs has also reduced the incentive for banks to fully respond to any changes in policy
rates. Both factors have resulted in slower decline of loan rates than the decrease of SBI
rates during the period. (See graph II.6)
The sensitivity of loan volume to policy rate changes (              ) has been declining during the
post-crisis period. It is even lower than the sensitivity during the pre-crisis period. Banks are
still very cautious in extending credit as evidenced by a higher CAR ratio. In addition, the
smaller NPLs ratio has reduced banks» loses significantly. This situation has reduced the need
SL rr ∂∂ /
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for banks to increase loan supply to cover losses from NPLs. On the other hand, as borrowers
are not suffering from solvability problems as heavily as during the peak of the crisis, their
demand for loans is less sensitive to interest rate changes.  Consequently, as monetary
authorities reduced the policy rates to boost aggregate demand, the increase in loan volume
was relatively slower than if the same policy was conducted during the pre-crisis period.
As banks are still maintaining higher CAR, the perceived costs of credit defaults are still
higher than the opportunity cost of holding idle funds (which is declining as NPLs are smaller).
This keeps loan rates less sensitive to policy rates relative to deposit rates. Consequently,
lower SBI rates reduce deposit rates faster than loan rates (the positive spread between
both rates widens) (see graph II.8).
IV. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
There are indications that bank disintermediation reduced the effectiveness of monetary
policy during the crisis and post-crisis period. Structural changes in banks and borrowers have
altered the smoothness and effectiveness of monetary policy. As banks are still the major source
of financing in Indonesia, this situation contributes to a slower pace of economic recovery
compared to other countries that experienced a similar crisis.
From the analysis above, it is shown that one of the serious problems facing the banking
community in Indonesia is asymmetric information. This problem has kept banks» risk perception
at a relatively high level, even though it has been declining, which may have led them to be
(overly) cautious. To overcome this problem, there is an apparent need to initiate efforts that
can provide more information regarding the credit-worthiness of the borrowers while at the
same time trying to continue boosting the real side of the economy.
This conclusion thus leads to the following policy implications:
The establishment of the planned Credit Bureau and rating agencies is critical as it will
improve transparency and availability of debtor information, thus reducing asymmetric
information problems. It may also reduce the cost of monitoring by banks and thus reducing
further the current abnormally high spread between loan and deposits rates.
To improve their knowledge in assessing risks, banks should invest more in research capacity
and credit monitoring system. The authorities could help by providing more information
regarding potential economic sectors and clear policy directions.
Considering the pervasive asymmetric information in the credit market for small and medium
enterprises, the introduction of a credit guarantee scheme can also be considered, with
minimum moral hazard.
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More importantly, the maintenance of macroeconomic stability needs to be continued in
order to enhance public confidence. In turn, with positive perception, default risk could be
lessened. As both monetary policy and banking regulations gain more positive impacts on
loan performance, the need for better coordination and harmonization between macro and
micro policies becomes greater.
Increasing the role of non-bank financial markets and increased competition in financial
markets should be promoted to reduce over dependence on banks, thereby gradually
promoting sound and efficient non-bank financing and thus reducing downward rigidity in
bank lending rates.
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APPENDIX
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